Prompt Injection on a Local Model: What Worked, What Did Not, and What the Fix Costs

Anyone can say prompt injection is a risk. This post shows three things that are harder to find, measured on a local model anyone can run: Which kind of injected text worked, and which did not. A blunt order to override the instructions did nothing to a scam message. A paragraph dressed up as a system block did. Why “the model can only add points” did not protect it. Our model can raise a verdict and never lower one. A sender could still take away what it had added. What a fix in the code, not in the prompt, costs. It closed the hole we tested, and it is paid for in model calls and false alarms. The numbers and their limits follow. All messages are synthetic, it is one model on one machine, and the whole record is public. ...

November 10, 2026 · 11 min · Nestor