Prompt Injection on a Local Model: What Worked, What Did Not, and What the Fix Costs

Anyone can say prompt injection is a risk. This post shows three things that are harder to find, measured on a local model anyone can run: Which kind of injected text worked, and which did not. A blunt order to override the instructions did nothing to a scam message. A paragraph dressed up as a system block did. Why “the model can only add points” did not protect it. Our model can raise a verdict and never lower one. A sender could still take away what it had added. What a fix in the code, not in the prompt, costs. It closed the hole we tested, and it is paid for in model calls and false alarms. The numbers and their limits follow. All messages are synthetic, it is one model on one machine, and the whole record is public. ...

November 10, 2026 · 11 min · Nestor

Ollama No Longer Calls Home From Our Mini, and Our Local Reader Answers Every Message: the Week of 27 October

This is the week’s build log in one piece: the two results in full, the rest in a paragraph each, every number linked to the artefact that produced it. The daily version is the build log in the evidence repository. The runtime phoned home every four hours. The switch that stops it works, measured. A colleague told us a local Qwen on his machine seemed to open connections while he used it: endpoints in China, then a host in France, “it just searches for data in a search engine.” That is the one failure the local-first thesis cannot survive. If inference is local, nothing leaves. We say so on this site and in Aprimerose’s material, and in exp_054 we had measured it for our own code. We had never watched a third-party model’s runtime while it ran. So we did, in exp_057, registered in the morning and run before lunch. ...

November 2, 2026 · 49 min · Nestor